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Energy Efficiency: Efficiency or Monopsony? 
 Timothy J. Brennan 
Abstract 
The cliché in the electricity sector, the “cheapest power plant is the one we don’t build,” seems to 
neglect the benefits of the energy that plant would generate.  Those overall benefits could be countered by 
benefits to consumers if “not building that plant” was the result of monopsony.  A regulator acting as a 
monopsonist may need to avoid rationing demand at monopsony prices.  Subsidizing energy efficiency to 
reduce electricity demand at the margin can solve that problem, if energy efficiency and electricity use are 
substitutes.  We may not observe these effects if the regulator can set price as well as quantity, lacks 
buyer-side market power, or is legally precluded from denying generators a reasonable return on capital.  
Nevertheless, the possibility of monopsony remains significant in light of the debate as to whether 
antitrust enforcement should maximize consumer welfare or total welfare.   
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Energy Efficiency: Efficiency or Monopsony? 
 Timothy J. Brennan ∗ 
Introduction 
An observation common in energy policy circles, to the point of being a cliché, is that 
“the cheapest power plant is the one you don’t build.”1  From the perspective of economic 
efficiency, if not necessarily energy efficiency, the statement is at best incomplete.  One needs to 
consider not only the cost saved by not building a plant, but also the benefits forgone in not 
building it.  Observing that “the cheapest elementary school is the one we don’t build” or “the 
cheapest polio shot is the one we don’t give” would be just as easy to do.   
A possible efficiency justification for not building plants is that the forgone benefits are 
less than the cost of the plant because the price of electricity is too low.  This is especially likely 
to hold in peak demand periods, in the absence of marginal cost real-time pricing.  The price of 
electricity may also be too low if there are negative environmental externalities not already 
reflected in the price of electricity through other policies, e.g., carbon taxes or emissions permit 
cap-and-trade programs.  A second, more problematic justification is that consumers are using 
too much electricity because they are unable to determine for themselves that they would 
individually profit from investing in energy efficiency (Brennan 2009). 
A third possibility has not received the attention it may deserve.  In a deregulated market, 
the price of energy paid to all suppliers will equal the marginal cost of the last unit produced.  
With an upward-sloping supply curve, this means that consumers as a group could benefit 
through monopsonistic reduction of energy purchases, in effect not building that last plant in 
order to hold the price down.  We examine the extent to which energy efficiency or demand-side 
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management policies may be worth undertaking from the perspective of the regulator acting as a 
monopsonist.2   
Such activity would not be efficient, in that the forgone benefits to consumers from 
additional electricity use would exceed the cost of the electricity production.  The extent to 
which regulators should nonetheless act monopsonistically connects directly to an ongoing 
debate regarding standards for antitrust violations.  That debate centers on whether conduct such 
as price discrimination or mergers should be evaluated on a total welfare standard, taking both 
profits and consumer surplus into account, or on a consumer welfare standard, recognizing only 
the latter.   
On the one side of the debate is the view that for reasons of congressional intent, 
distributive justice, or to correct for antienforcement bias in the policy process, the standard for 
assessing violations should be exclusively consumer welfare; cost savings captured in seller 
profit should not outweigh consumer harms (Fisher and Lande 1983; Pittman 2007).  On the 
other side is the view that the total welfare efficiency standard used in comparing costs with 
benefits in every other policy arena ought to be applied in antitrust.  Proponents support this 
view both on traditional efficiency grounds and on the view that over the long run, total surplus 
ends up being passed on to consumers (Heyer 2006; Carlton 2007). 
The continuing debate regarding consumer vs. total welfare in antitrust prevents us from 
assuming that regulators, even if motivated by policy norms rather than special interests, would 
look to economic efficiency.  This leads us to consider whether a regulator would want to 
maximize consumer welfare by monopsony and intervene in energy efficiency markets to do so.  
The next section of the paper introduces the basic monopsony model for those unfamiliar with it.  
It also shows that if demand is rationed over all purchases for which the willingness to pay 
exceeds the price, monopsonistic price reductions could reduce consumer welfare alone, as 
buyers with low willingness to pay effectively take output from those with high willingness to 
pay.   
The following section addresses efficiency investments.  It begins by showing that the 
effect of energy efficiency on electricity demand needs to be assumed; for sufficiently high 
                                                 
2 This view of the regulator as favoring consumers runs counter to the classic view of the regulator as captured by 
the regulated firm (Stigler, 1971) or as reacting to differential political influence from stakeholders (Peltzman, 
1976).  The potential for monopsony is more in line with the opportunistic perspective in Gilbert and Newbery 
(1994). Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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prices, increased energy efficiency would typically induce more, not less, energy use.  Assuming 
that at the margin energy efficiency and electricity are substitutes, we find the simple “price 
equals marginal cost” optimum for electricity use and energy efficiency investment.  We then 
provide our main result: If consumer welfare alone is the policy norm, a regulator would want to 
subsidize energy efficiency to reduce demand just to reduce price.  We then discuss caveats, 
including (a) whether a regulator that could set price and quantity would monopsonize, (b) lack 
of market power on the buyer side, and (c) implications of the divergence between price and 
short-run marginal cost.  A brief conclusion follows.  
Monopsony Basics 
Overview of the Theory 
The basic theory of monopsony is the familiar monopoly model turned upside down.  In 
monopoly, a single seller finds it worthwhile to hold product off the market to raise price.  
Unlike a price-taking firm, which acts as if it can sell as much as it wants at the prevailing price, 
a single firm in a market can increase sales only by depressing the price.  This requirement to 
depress price provides an incentive to withhold output that is not present for a firm acting 
competitively.  For a monopolist, the firm’s marginal revenue is thus less than the price.  
Maximizing profit, by choosing the level of output at which marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost, will thus lead to a price above marginal cost.  A welfare loss follows, as the marginal 
benefit of additional production—the price—exceeds the marginal cost of additional production, 
indicating too little output.  Figure 1 reproduces the familiar diagram. 
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Monopsony flips this story over.  Instead of a single seller, we have a single buyer.  
Under a competition, buyers as price-takers act as if their volume of purchases has no effect on 
the price they pay.  However, a single buyer will take into account the possibility that increasing 
the quantity it purchases will raise the market price and, thus, the price it pays for all the units it 
purchases.  Just as marginal revenue is less than price for a monopolist, the marginal 
expenditure—the incremental effect of purchases on spending—will exceed the marginal cost of 
producing the good.  In maximizing its welfare, the monopsonist will equate its marginal 
willingness to pay, represented by its demand curve, with the marginal expenditure, which in 
turn exceeds the price it pays, which equals the marginal cost of production.  Because marginal 
willingness to pay exceeds marginal cost, again there is too little output.  Figure 2 diagrams the 
situation. 
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The simple mathematics of monopsony will prove useful in analyzing the potential 
relevance of nominal energy efficiency programs that cut demand.  The objective of the single Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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buyer is to choose the level of purchases q to maximize its gross surplus from those purchases, 
less its expenditure on them.  Assuming a competitive supply curve,
3 
the price the buyer pays has to equal the marginal cost of the sellers.  Therefore, the 
buyer’s expenditure is just c'(q)q, where c is the cost of producing q by the sellers and c' is the 
marginal cost.  The buyer’s gross surplus is given as the sum of its marginal willingness to pay 
for each unit up to q, represented as the area under its demand curve, where the demand curve is 
given by w(q).  Thus, the buyer chooses q to maximize 
  ∫ −
q
q q c dz z w
0 ) ( ' ) ( 
which occurs at the level of purchases q for which 
 w (q) – c'(q) = c"(q)q.   (1) 
From an overall efficiency perspective, we have too few purchases if the marginal 
willingness to pay exceeds marginal cost, which occurs when the right-hand side is positive.  
That will be the case if c" > 0, i.e., the marginal cost curve slopes upward.  Another way to view 
this condition is by dividing both sides of (1) by c'(q): 
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where es is the elasticity of supply.  The condition for monopsony to reduce output below the 
efficient level, c" > 0, is thus equivalent to es < ∞; the elasticity of supply is finite.   
The Rationing Problem 
The monopsonist’s optimization problem assumes that the q units purchased are used to 
meet demand with the highest marginal willingness to pay or reservation price.  For a single 
buyer, that assumption is reasonable.  It need not hold when the monopsony is executed on 
                                                 
3 For clarity of illustrating the potential monopsony incentive for subsidizing efficiency investments, we assume that 
the supply curve of electricity is competitive.  Some studies have found the opposite, e.g., Borenstein, Bushnell, and 
Wolak (2002).  Although utilities may well have unilateral incentives to withhold electricity to raise price, these 
studies are flawed by relying on comparisons between price and average variable costs, when prices at or close to 
peak period in perfectly competitive markets would include premiums for capital cost recovery (Brennan 2006).  
Looking at quantities withheld rather than price is more informative; an example of a recent study taking that 
approach is Kwoka and Sabodash (2009).  Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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behalf of a set of consumers who make purchases independently.  It could be arranged to hold if 
those who are able to purchase the good at the low monopsony price are then able to resell the 
good.  This might be plausible in the textbook example where a municipality attempts to 
monopsonize a local apartment market through rent control, but then allows those who get 
apartments at low rent to sublet them to those tenants willing to pay the highest rents.   
In the case of electricity, resale of purchased but unused kilowatt-hours seems 
impractical.  If each consumer demands as much as she wants at the monopsony price, demand 
(greater than that at the competitive price) will exceed supply (less than that at the competitive 
price).  Any individual consumer presumably is using the kilowatt-hours in the ways she views 
most valuable, but there is little to suggest that those will be all of the hours purchased.  For 
monopsony to be effective, some sort of rationing scheme needs to be implemented.   
Illuminating the importance of this concern, it turns out that if rationing is purely random, 
an agent acting on behalf of a set of consumers—such as a regulator—may not find monopsony 
worth exercising, even if motivated solely by the welfare of buyers and not that of the economy 
as a whole.  To see this, we model the benefits purchasers make under monopsony as if the 
demand curve is shifted in proportionally such that the purchases made at the lower price just 
equal the amount supplied at the lower price.
4   
Figure 3 illustrates the effect.  The dark shaded area represents the gains from 
monopsony, roughly equal to the price reduction obtained by those who are able to purchase the 
good at the lower price.  The light gray area represents the loss of welfare from the rationing, 
representing buyers with high valuations who are unable to purchase the good.  It turns out that 
at the margin, beginning at the competitive price, the light area can exceed the dark area, 
indicating that the benefits of low prices are outweighed by the costs of the rationing those low 
prices induce.  
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To understand when rationing makes monopsony unprofitable, it is useful to model 
consumer surplus as a function of the price the monopsonizing agent, e.g., the regulator, would 
set.  Letting d(p) be the demand from consumers at price p, the consumer surplus from 
purchasing electricity at p is given by 
  ∫
∞
p dz z d ) ( . 
Consumers cannot purchase as much as they would like at price p, however.  To 
represent rationing, we assume that the fraction of consumers who can obtain the good is the 
simple ratio s(p)/d(p), where d(p) is as above and s(p) is the supply at p (equal to the quantity 
where marginal cost c'(s(p)) = p).  We assume further, perhaps as a worst-case scenario, that this 
rationing ratio applies equally along the demand curve.
5  Those with high reservation prices are 
not disproportionately more likely to obtain the product than those with low reservation prices.
6  
If so, the rationed consumer surplus as a function of price, CS(p), is simply 
                                                 
5 In the conventional monopsony story, those with the highest reservation prices get as much as they want at the 
monopsony price, and those with the lowest reservation prices get nothing, maximizing the consumer surplus 
obtainable at that price. 
6 That this is an extreme case is indicated by recognizing that each individual consumer would presumably allocate 
her reduced purchases of the product to those uses she finds most valuable.  Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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∞
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The derivative of CS(p) is 
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The first term in (4) is negative, reflecting the gains from reducing price, but the second 
term is positive, reflecting the lost surplus resulting from rationing along the demand curve.  
Monopsony with rationing would reduce welfare, at least at the margin, if CS' > 0 at the 
competitive price, where s(p) = d(p).  Letting p be the competitive price and collecting terms in 
(4), recognizing that s(p) = d(p), gives the result that monopsony reduces welfare at the margin if 
















Rearranging terms further allows us to rewrite this condition as 





,   (5) 
where es and ed are, respectively, the elasticities of supply and demand.7  We thus have 
Proposition 1: If consumers are uniformly rationed, rather than quantities going to uses with 
the highest reservation prices, then monopsonistic price reductions can reduce welfare if 
the elasticities of supply and demand are sufficiently large.  
The condition in (5) tells us that if, at the competitive price, the sum of the elasticities of 
supply and (in absolute value) demand exceeds the ratio of expenditures to consumer surplus at 
the competitive price, monopsony could reduce welfare.  Intuitively, a high sum of the 
elasticities means that the rationing induced by the increase in price, measured by the ratio of 
supply to demand, will be relatively greater and could outweigh the direct benefit to buyers from 
reducing the price.  Recall that absent rationing, monopsony improves consumer welfare as long 
as es < ∞.  Consequently, a regulator acting as an electricity monopsonist will want to look at 
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ways to inhibit the excess demand that leads to the rationing loss.  This is where “energy 
efficiency” enters the picture.  
Consumer Welfare Alone Implies Inefficient Efficiency Subsidies 
The Base Case: Optimal Energy and Efficiency Prices under a Total Welfare 
Standard 
Energy efficiency investments, such as high-efficiency air conditioners or compact 
fluorescent light bulbs, change the level of energy services that one obtains from a given amount 
of electricity.  This, in turn, will move the demand curve for electricity.  Before modeling this, it 
is useful to understand that the effect on the demand curve is not simply a reduction in demand.  
Because energy efficiency increases the amount of energy services one gets, the value consumers 
get from initial levels of consumption will increase, not decrease.  Thus, the effect of energy 
efficiency investments is not to shift the demand curve down, as in the left graph in Figure 4, but 
to pivot it, as illustrated by the graph on the right, where d(p, x) is the demand for electricity at 
price p and with energy efficiency investments of x, and d(p, x + Δx) is the demand for 
electricity when Δx additional investment in energy efficiency is made.
8 
                                                 
8 Because surplus from electricity use is the sum of the area under the demand curve and the surplus one gets from 
not using electricity at all, this pivoting result may not hold if the benefit a consumer gets from using no electricity 
following an increased investment in efficiency increases by more than the reduced value she gets from using 
energy.     Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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Figure 4. Effect of Energy Efficiency on Electricity Demand9 
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Figure 4 is important because it illustrates that the effect of energy efficiency on 
electricity consumption depends on energy prices.  For efficiency services to increase the value 
consumers get from using electricity, there must be prices at which efficiency investments will 
increase, not decrease, the demand for electricity.  The increase in the value of the services from 
electricity increases its value at the margin up to a point and thus increases demand.  Hence, 
what is known as the “rebound effect” (Gottron 2001)—that increased efficiency can spur 
demand for energy, not reduce it—not just may hold, but will hold at some prices.   
To see this, adapt the above notation to let w(q, x) be the marginal willingness to pay for 
the qth unit of electricity, with x units of energy efficiency in place.  For example, one might 
imagine the value of the 100th kilowatt-hour of electricity with 10 compact fluorescent bulbs 
installed.  The total value V(q, x) of that level of energy to a consumer is thus 
 V (q, x) = V(0, x) +∫
q
dz x z w
0
) , ( .   (6) 
where V(0, x) is the value consumers get with x units of energy efficiency installed when no 
energy is used.  This differs from the usual consumer surplus formulation by allowing for 
positive benefit with zero use of the product, but with investment in equipment or service that 
changes the value one gets from use of the product.  This could happen if the energy efficiency 
                                                 
9 Figure 4 is adapted from Brennan (2009). Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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investment enabled consumers to avoid using energy in some cases, e.g., draft-proofing doors 
and windows to keep a house warm without having to run a furnace.10   
By definition, energy efficiency increases the value the consumer gets from a given 
quantity of energy use, implying that Vx(q, x) > 0.  From (6), 
 V x(q, x) = Vx(0, x) +∫
q
x dz x z w
0
) , ( > 0.   (7) 
The term wx is the change in willingness to pay for electricity resulting from increased energy 
efficiency.  It thus indicates how the demand curve for electricity shifts, as in Figure 4.  For the 
demand curve to fall everywhere, wx(q, x) < 0 for all q.  That would imply the above expression 
is negative, contradicting the definition of energy efficiency, unless Vx(0, x) were sufficiently 
large; i.e., the benefit from the energy conservation investment with no energy use renders 
additional use of energy less beneficial than otherwise.  Hence, there must be some q° for which 
wx(q°, x) > 0.  Moreover, if wxq < 0, i.e., the effect of energy efficiency on the marginal value of 
electricity falls with the amount of electricity consumed—and it needs to become negative to 
induce conservation—then there exists some q* for which wx = 0, wx > 0 for q < q*, and wx < 0 
for q > q*.  
Together, those findings with (7) imply that Figure 4 describes the effect of increasing 
energy efficiency on electricity demand:    
Proposition 2: Unless energy efficiency investments convey benefits to consumers when they 
use no energy at all, an increase in energy efficiency investments will cause the demand 
curve for electricity to pivot at some level q*, assuming the effect of increased energy 
efficiency on the marginal willingness to pay for electricity falls with the quantity of 
electricity consumed.  
For sufficiently low levels of energy use or sufficiently high energy prices, the rebound effect 
would be observed; it may be empirically unlikely but it is theoretically predictable.  As a 
consequence, the assumption that efficiency investments reduce demand is empirical, not 
theoretical.  It is equivalent to assuming that energy is sufficiently inexpensive that the reduction 
in the marginal value of energy services obtained from a given level of electricity consumption 
                                                 
10 I owe this example to Michael Waterson. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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outweighs the gain from the increased per-unit quantity of energy services that efficiency 
investments produce.  We make that assumption here, and thus for convenience and without loss 
of generality, we drop the V(0, x) term for the value of no energy use from subsequent 
discussion.  
The Base Case: Optimal Energy and Efficiency Prices under a Total Welfare 
Standard 
We can formally model the base case for energy efficiency investments, using a 
conventional overall welfare standard of maximizing consumer surplus plus profits.  As above, 
let q be the quantity of electricity produced and x the amount of energy efficiency used.  The 
willingness to pay for the marginal unit of electricity (i.e., the demand curve for electricity), 
given the energy efficiency investment in place, is w(q, x).  The cost of producing electricity is 
given by c(q), and the cost of energy efficiency is h(x). Total net economic welfare is given by 
  ∫ − −
q
x h q c dz x z w
0 ) ( ) ( ) , (.  
Choosing q and x to maximize total welfare gives the conditions 
 w (q, x) = c'(q); 
  ∫ −
q
x x h dz x z w
0 ) ( ' ) , ( . 
The left-hand side in the latter condition above is the change in surplus from increasing energy 
efficiency investment, given the quantity of electricity used—the marginal willingness to pay for 
energy efficiency.11  Assuming there are no other constraints, in particular, that prices for 
electricity and energy efficiency are sufficiently high for all suppliers to cover cost, both of these 
conditions are essentially that price—marginal benefit—of electricity and energy efficiency just 
equals marginal cost of production.  
                                                 
11 If energy efficiency shifted the entire demand curve for electricity downward, wx < 0 for all q, and the integral on 
the left-hand side would be negative, implying that the demand for energy efficiency would be zero.  This also 
assumes rational choice of energy efficiency on the part of consumers, an assumption many energy policy advocates 
doubt (Brennan 2009).   Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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Inefficient Subsidies for Monopsony 
To analyze whether the regulator might have monopsonistic incentives to intervene in the 
energy efficiency market, we modify the above optimization exercise to maximize consumer 
welfare from electricity sales, not total welfare, continuing to assume for simplicity of exposition 
that electricity is supplied competitively.
12  To focus on incentives to intervene in the energy 
efficiency market because of the specific effects on the welfare from electricity, we assume that 
the total cost of energy efficiency is subtracted from consumer welfare.
13     
With those assumptions, we assume the regulator is choosing the quantity of electricity 
and amount of energy efficiency investment purchased to maximize consumer welfare alone. 
 )] ( ' ) , ( [ ) ( ) , ( ) , (
0 q c x q w x h q x q w dz x z w
q
− λ + − − ∫    (8) 
The first two terms are the consumer surplus, the area under the demand curve less the revenue.  
There is now no rationing; the quantity demanded at the price w(q, x) is q.  The middle term is 
the cost of energy efficiency, which, as noted above, we assume consumers bear.14  The last term 
is a constraint requiring that the price at which consumers would demand q units covers the 
marginal cost of producing the q
th unit. 
The first-order condition for maximizing consumer welfare from the choice of electricity 
is 
  λ[wq(q, x) – c"(q)] = wq(q, x)q, 
which gives 
 
) ( " ) , (
) , (






= λ . 
                                                 
12 See note 3 supra. 
13 This could be justified by assuming that energy efficiency is sold under constant costs (h" = 0), implying that 
there is no benefit to attempting to monopsonize against the energy efficiency sector as well.  To the extent the costs 
of a subsidy could be shifted away from the regulator’s client buyers, the case for monopsony would be stronger.  
However, I’ve observed that energy efficiency subsidies are to be covered by utilities, which then would pass those 
program costs on to the buyers.  
14 Energy efficiency subsidies could be paid for by surcharges on electricity prices (Brennan 2009).  Incorporating 
this, however, would only subtract a second-order “triangle” effect from the consumer welfare calculation.   Resources for the Future  Brennan 
14 
Because wq is negative (downward-sloping demand) and c" is nonnegative (flat or upward-
sloping marginal cost), we have 
  λ ≤ q,   (9) 
with equality holding only if c" = 0, i.e., with perfectly elastic supply of electricity. 
From (8), the first-order condition for energy efficiency investments is 
 ] )[ , ( ) ( ' ) , (
0 λ − = − ∫
q
x x q x q w x h dz x z w .   (10) 
The integral term on the left-hand side of (10) is the marginal value to consumers of energy 
efficiency, i.e., its price.  The second term, h', is the marginal cost of energy efficiency, so the 
left-hand side is price less marginal cost.  The first term is negative from our assumption that at 
the margin, energy efficiency reduces use by reducing the willingness to pay for the last unit of 
electricity.  The last term is nonnegative from (9), the first-order condition for maximizing 
consumer welfare from electricity use, and is strictly positive whenever monopsony would be 
ideally profitable, i.e., unless supply of electricity is perfectly elastic. 
Equation (10) thus implies that at the optimum, the price of energy efficiency would be 
less than its cost.  Even if consumers bear the full cost of the subsidy—reflected in subtracting 
h(x) from consumer welfare—the monopsonistic effects of the reduction in price would explain 
why a regulator would want to subsidize energy efficiency on behalf of consumers.  We 
summarize this as 
Proposition 3: If supply is less than perfectly elastic, rendering monopsony profitable, a 
regulator motivated solely by consumer welfare would subsidize energy efficiency, to 
reduce demand for electricity and thus reduce its price, even if consumers bear the 
full cost of the subsidy.   
Caveats 
The insights from the above result need to be qualified by some potential aspects of the 
regulatory setting or the nature of the electricity supply curve. 
Would a Consumer-Oriented Regulator Monopsonize? 
The argument that a regulator pursuing only consumer welfare would reduce purchases to 
drive price down, even if rationing were not a problem, rests on the assumption that price has to 
equal the cost of producing the marginal unit supplied.  This need not hold.  One exception Resources for the Future  Brennan 
15 
would be price discrimination, purchasing each unit at its marginal price.  This, however, may 
not be feasible because of information limitations associated with knowing the marginal cost of 
producing each unit.   
A second issue would be to expand the regulator’s ability, perhaps only slightly, to allow 
it to set price and quantity independently, constrained only by the ability of the sellers to cover 
cost.  If all sellers are identical—an eventuality unlikely to be realized in electricity markets—or 
if the regulator can set individual supply targets for each generator (to minimize overall 
production costs),
15 this decision could be represented by choosing quantity q and price p  to 
maximize gross consumer surplus less expenditure, subject to the constraint that expenditure 
equals the total cost of producing the given quantity of electricity.  
  ∫ − λ − −
q
q c pq pq dz z w
0 )] ( [ ) (.  
This expression is equivalent to choosing q to maximize total welfare, gross consumer 
surplus less costs c(q), and then setting price equal to average cost (c(q)/q) at that q, transferring 
all of the producer surplus to the buyers.  If regulators can mandate supply rather than have 
suppliers independently choose how to maximize profits at the regulated price, the regulator 
simply sets quantity where total surplus is maximized and then uses price to transfer that entire 
surplus to consumers.
16  The temptation to monopsony arises for a consumer welfare–oriented 
regulator only if it is limited in its capacity to set minimum levels of supply as well as maximum 
levels of price. 
Could a Consumer-Oriented Regulator Monopsonize? 
The analysis of monopsony here presupposes that the buyers within the regulator’s 
jurisdiction collectively possess market power that the regulator could exploit to their advantage.  
This need not be the case.  Markets in which generators sell electricity typically span multiple 
states.  For example, PJM, the main regional wholesale market operator in the mid-Atlantic 
region, serves virtually all of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, West Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, 
and Virginia, along with substantial portions of Ohio and parts of four other states.  A regulator 
                                                 
15 One could also achieve cost minimization by issuing q marketable production permits. 
16 This result is a corollary to Becker’s (1983) argument that political processes would achieve efficient outcomes to 
maximize the amount that could be distributed to stakeholders; in this case, there is only one stakeholder with 
political influence. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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in one of these states would probably not control a sufficiently large market share to be able to 
drive down the price of electricity sold over such a large region.
17   
On the other hand, some regional wholesale market operators operate over essentially a 
single state.  Three examples include the independent system operators serving California 
(CAISO), New York (NYISO), and Texas (ERCOT).  Although the last of these has deregulated 
its retail market,
18 any one of these could find it useful on behalf of its buyers to subsidize energy 
efficiency solely to drive the price of electricity below the price that a competitive market would 
set.   
At times of high demand, however, transmission constraints may limit the geographic 
scope of electricity markets, creating “load pockets.”  These small geographic areas may be 
intrastate, even when during unconstrained periods the relevant markets match the large 
interstate transmission organizations, such as PJM.  These small markets would then fall within 
the jurisdiction of a state regulator and create the potential for monopsony during peak periods.  
It is also important to recognize that absent real-time pricing, electricity demand at such peak 
periods is likely to be excessive because the time-averaged prices will be below cost, sometimes 
by orders of magnitude, for reasons discussed in the next section.  In such cases, energy 
efficiency subsidies would be an economically efficient second-best response to the underpricing 
of electricity when energy efficiency and electricity use are substitutes, i.e., when subsidizing 
energy efficiency reduces electricity use.   
Is Electricity Generation Susceptible to Monopsony? 
One of the accepted observations in electricity is that the supply curve goes from nearly 
horizontal over long stretches to almost vertical, in a “hockey stick” shape (Sweeney 2002 at 
112).  To some degree, this reflects an expectation that electricity is produced with durable 
generators.  Those that are installed with the expectation of serving only at times of high demand 
are likely to have lower capital costs and higher operating costs (Crew and Kleindorfer 1987).  
Sweeney (2002) observes that electricity supplies in California exhibit this property, resulting in 
an increasing marginal cost function.  Off peak, when demand is low, the market is in the flat 
part of the hockey stick, where supply is highly elastic, implying monopsony would not be a 
                                                 
17 http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/how-we-operate/territory-served.aspx, accessed February 24, 2009. 
18 The last of these, Texas, has largely deregulated its operations.  
http://www.powertochoose.org/_content/_resources/faqs.asp, accessed February 24, 2009. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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significant matter.  At peak demand periods, marginal costs appear to be increasing, i.e., c" > 0, 
rendering monopsony potentially profitable.   
But appearances may deceive.  One needs to be careful in making this inference because 
high prices need not imply high marginal costs, as normally understood.  Since electricity cannot 
be stored, the capacity to produce electricity that might be used at any given time has to be in 
place all of the time.  Some capacity will thus be used only a small fraction of the time.  To take 
what I believe to be a representative example, in Ontario, peak electricity demand is about 27 
gigawatts, but capacity in excess of 25 gigawatts is used for only 32 of the 8,760 hours over the 
course of a year (IESO 2007).  If the same generation technology were used to provide electricity 
during these 32 hours as over the rest of the time, the average cost per kilowatt-hour of the 
capacity used to provide that kilowatt-hour would be more than 270 (8,760/32) times the cost of 
capacity used that provides electricity all the time. 
This is why Crew and Kleindorfer (1987) found that one would expect that generators 
used infrequently would be designed to use less expensive capital per kilowatt of power capacity 
and more fuel per kilowatt-hour of energy produced.  But assume for the moment that this were 
not true because there were no technological options in generation, leading to fixed proportions 
of capital to energy produced.  If so, one would expect the price of electricity to be greater when 
more is used, but not because the marginal cost of generating electricity increases with output.  
Rather, it would be only because more electricity is used a shorter fraction of time, increasing the 
average cost of the capacity and requiring higher prices to cover that capital cost.
19   
As a consequence, one could observe a positive relationship between electricity supplied 
and price, but with constant short-run marginal cost over the entire range.  As noted, there is 
likely to be some positive relationship between supply and marginal cost because more fuel-
intensive and less capital-intensive technologies would be employed the smaller fraction of time 
over which that higher demand is observed.  However, short-run marginal cost is still likely to be 
increasing less dramatically than price.  If marginal cost is not increasing very quickly, 
monopsony may be less dramatic or powerful.  Recall that for monopsony to hold, c" > 0, and 
the above discussion shows that c" = 0 could be consistent with a strong correlation between 
                                                 
19 As noted above, insufficient recognition of this aspect of electricity pricing has led to erroneous measures of 
market power based on measuring price against only average variable cost, used as a proxy for marginal cost 
(Brennan, 2006). Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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price and supply.  In the extreme, a regulator would be tempted to drive demand just below the 
capacity in place to serve it, driving price down to the short-run marginal cost.   
If so, however, the greater problem may not be monopsony as such, but opportunism 
(Gilbert and Newbery 1994).  The gains in consumer surplus would be not from driving down a 
supply curve as normally understood, but from refusing to pay for capital once installed.  The 
potential for such opportunism is widely understood, serving as the foundation for the important 
legal decisions that state and reinforce obligations to ensure that regulated firms have a fair 
opportunity to cover capital cost.  As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Federal Power Commission 
v. Hope Natural Gas (citations omitted),
20 
The ratemaking process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of “just and reasonable” 
rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.  Thus we 
stated in the Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case that “regulation does not insure that 
the business shall produce net revenues.”  But such considerations aside, the 
investor interest has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the 
company whose rates are being regulated.  From the investor or company point of 
view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses 
but also for the capital costs of the business.  These include service on the debt 
and dividends on the stock.  By that standard the return to the equity owner should 
be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having 
corresponding risks.  That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure 
confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit 
and to attract capital.   
In effect, the legal obligation to allow regulated entities to earn a return on capital, in preventing 
a regulator from driving prices down by reducing purchases given capacity in place, could deter 
monopsonistic reductions in purchases altogether.  
Conclusion 
Good reasons abound for concern that electricity demand is excessive.  Electricity may be 
underpriced during peak demand periods, because inability to charge time-based rates means that 
price during peak periods may be vastly below the cost of producing electricity.  Negative 
externalities from air pollution or greenhouse gases that are not (yet) reflected in prices through 
appropriate taxes or emissions limitation policies could justify subsidizing investments to reduce 
                                                 
20 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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electricity demand.  Some might argue that consumers fail to correctly invest in energy 
efficiency that would earn adequate returns through reduced expenditures on electricity over 
time. 
Our focus here has been on the possibility that energy efficiency may be a device to 
implement monopsony against electricity suppliers.  After describing monopsony, we showed 
that the inability to divert reduced purchases to those with the highest reservation prices could 
make monopsony unprofitable if supply and demand are sufficiently elastic.  The main result is 
that energy efficiency investments solve this problem and would be subsidized by a regulator 
with the ability to monopsonize, even if consumers bear the full and not just the subsidized cost 
of those investments.   
The ability or inclination of a regulator to monopsonize may be thwarted if it can set 
price and quantity together, lacks market power on the buying side, and is under legal obligations 
to ensure that those it regulates can recover capital costs.  Of continuing interest, however, is that 
monopsony could be viewed as an appropriate policy goal in the first place, in a way monopoly 
virtually never would be.
21  In general, public policy analysis, even if not driven specifically by 
economic considerations, nevertheless typically grants at least some weight to gains across the 
board, not just to consumers (Bardach 2005).  Antitrust law in the United States and most of the 
world—Canada being an exception (Ross and Winter 2005)—nevertheless treats consumers as 
paramount.  Those who believe this should, as a matter of logic, endorse the proposition that a 
regulator ought to monopsonize if able to do so.  Thus, when we hear advocacy of energy 
efficiency on the grounds that we would be better off without that last generator, one should not 





                                                 
21 A possible exception might be labor unions, but even there one could view the object as maximizing “consumer 
welfare,” with the presumption that workers are the same people as consumers. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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Appendix 
Although the purpose of introducing the rationing model was to illustrate the possibility 
that rationing could eliminate gains to consumers from monopsony, there may be some interest 
in looking at more general settings than the extreme case in which all consumers with a 
reservation price above the monopsony price have an equal chance at getting the product.22  To 
look at a range of settings, we posit a price p* in between the monopsony price p and the 
willingness to pay for the marginal unit produced at the monopsony price.  Only consumers with 
reservation prices above p* can purchase the good, and they are rationed equally by the fraction 
s(p)/d(p*), where s(p) is the supply at the monopsony price p.  Figure A1 illustrates the welfare 
effects. 
















loss from rationing, 
reduced output 
consumer surplus gain 
from lower prices 
 
At one extreme, p* = p, leading to Figure 3 in the text.  At the other extreme, p* is the 
willingness to pay for the marginal unit at the monopsony price, giving the maximum consumer 
benefit as described in Figure 2.  To model the intermediate cases, define p* specifically to be a 
weighted average of the monopsony price and the willingness to pay for the marginal unit 
supplied at the monopsony price: 
                                                 
22 I thank Svetlana Ikonnikova for this suggestion. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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 p *(p) = t[d
-1(s(p)] + [1 – t]p. 
It will be important to have on hand that 
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where es and ed are the elasticities of supply and demand, with ed < 0. 
Consumer surplus as a function of price, CS(p), is 
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As with the specific example in the text, the question is whether CS'(p) > 0 at the 
competitive price, which would indicate that monopsony is unprofitable because of the rationing 
effect.  Because p* = p and s(p) = d(p) = d(p*) at the competitive price, we can simplify the 
above expression considerably:  
















This expression implies that the general condition for monopsony to reduce consumer welfare 
because of rationing is the minimal adaptation of (5) in the text. 





.   (A2) 
If t = 0, p*' = 1, and we get the condition in the text for when all demand is rationed equally.  
Under ideal monopsony, t = 1, and from (A1), 




















implying that A2, the condition for monopsony to reduce welfare, becomes 








Since both of these are positive, this will not happen; hence monopsony increases consumer 
welfare if there is no rationing of high-demand consumers. 
 
 
    